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INTRODUCTION

In the 1985 session of the General Assembly, North Carolina
became the twenty-eighth state to enact legislation regulating the
termination and non-renewal of farm machinery and implement
franchises. The Farm Machinery Franchise Act 1 (hereinafter
"FMFA" or "Act") provides, in its essential terms, that upon termination of a franchise relationship the franchisor (typically the
manufacturer) is obligated to repurchase the inventory of the franchisee (the retail dealer). The Act became effective October 1,
1985.
In comparison to statutes of other states regulating franchise
relationships in the marketing of agricultural implements, the
FMFA bears many similarities and one significant difference. Similar are the coverage, requirement of notice by the terminating
party, repurchase terms, and remedies available for non-compliance. Markedly distinct from virtually every statute regulating implement franchises, and indeed every statute regulating any
franchise relationship, is the absence of a requirement of "good
cause" prior to lawful termination. The absence of the "good
cause" requirement is not a mere oversight but rather is one of the
first attempts in several decades by a legislative body to enact an
innovative approach to the troublesome area of franchise
terminations.
This comment examines the FMFA as it applies to the agricultural implement industry as well as its context in regard to the
generic franchise relationship. The provisions of the Act are set
forth and discussed. Finally, certain provisions of the Act are critically examined and potential interpretations are offered.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND OF THE ACT

The Advantages of Franchising

The past several decades have witnessed the growth of the
franchise-type business relationship as a distinct method of mar1. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-180 to -188 (Michie 1985). The Act is entitled "An
Act to Provide for Franchise Agreements Between Dealers Engaged in the Business of Retailing Farm, Utility, and Industrial Implements, Equipment, Attachments, or Repair Parts, and Wholesalers, Manufacturers, or Distributors of the
Products; To Require Repurchase of Inventory From Dealers Upon Termination
of a Contract; To Provide Procedures; To Establish Limitations, Rights, and Civil
Liability Relative to Repurchase; To Extend the Right to Require Repurchase
Option to the Heirs of Dealers; and To Provide Warranty Obligations.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss2/5
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keting. In 1983, there were 462,000 franchise outlets throughout
the United States2 producing 460 billion dollars of sales, a three
hundred percent increase from 1969 and a one hundred ninety percent increase from 1976.1 The franchising system has been described as:
a preferred method of distribution by companies of all sizes, [providing] an easy and efficient distribution system at little cost and
with little of the irritations and responsibilities of an integrated
system.4
The potential benefits available to both the franchisee and the
franchisor make this method of distribution popular. For the franchisee, the license to use a nationally recognized trademark creates
instant recognition and goodwill. The franchisor may provide the
franchisee with national advertising, marketing, business consultation, and guidance in capital matters. By taking advantage of economies of scale, the franchisee enjoys many advantages over the sole
proprietor."
Similarly, the franchisor benefits financially and practically
from the relationship. In financial terms, the franchisor can realize
income from a variety of sources beyond the direct income from
the distribution of its products. The initial sale of the franchise
can be accompanied by a franchise fee, and the franchisee is often
charged a royalty for the licensed use of the trademark and business systems. The availability of an assured distribution network
increases the franchisor's profits by providing an assured demand
and reducing the need for a large inventory. Additional income is
realized through the extension of credit for inventory purchases
throughout the franchise network. In a practical sense, the
franchise system allows the franchisor to forgo the complex administrative hierarchy, salaries, and fringe benefits associated with a
vertically integrated business.6
The franchise method of marketing is particularly well-suited
2. Whittemore, The Great Franchise Boom, NATIONS BUSINESS 20 (Sept.
1984); See further Whittemore, Franchising'sFuture, NATIONS BUSINESS 47 (Feb.
1986) (quoting researcher John Naisbitt's prediction that "sales by business format franchises will likely reach $1.3 trillion in the year 2010").
3. Whittemore, supra note 2, at 20.
4. H. BROWN, FRANCHISING: TRAP FOR THE TRUSTING iii (1969)(Introductory
remark by Sen. Philip Hart).
5. H. BROWN, FRANCHISING: REALITIES AND REMEDIES 6-11 (2d ed. 1978).
6. Id.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1986
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for the agricultural implement industry and is the primary method
employed. The John Deere Company began its branch marketing
operations soon after the Civil War.7 Today, there are approximately 7,600 franchised implement dealers nationwide.' Since agricultural implements are sold primarily to customers living in rural
areas removed from most commercial activity, direct distribution
of a manufacturer's products through company stores is economically and administratively impossible. By franchising, however, the
manufacturer can access these low density and geographically disparate markets through the licensing of local businesses.
B.

The Pitfalls of Franchising

In spite of the tremendous popularity of franchising as a
method of marketing, inherent in its structure is the potential for
conflict between the franchisor and the franchisee. Virtually all
problems associated with the franchise relationship can ultimately
be attributed to the vast disparity in bargaining power held by the
parties to the agreement and the ability of the franchisor to terminate the franchisee.9 The franchisor possesses skilled bargaining
power, financial strength, professional advisors, access to marketing data, and a minimized exposure to loss. The franchisor drafts
the franchise agreement defining the rights and duties of the franchisee. 10 The franchisee, on the other hand, is typically an inexperienced businessman with little understanding of the rights and liabilities of the franchise relationship who nonetheless invests a
7. W.

A HISTORY OF DEERE & COMPANY
175-76 (1984).
8. Jeffries, Farm Equipment Dealers Withering, News & Observer, March
18, 1986, at D-1, col. 1. 9. See generally, Bills to Correct Inequities in Certain FranchisePractices,
to Provide Franchisorsand Franchiseeswith Even Handed Protection from Unfair Practices, to Provide Consumers with the Benefits which Accrue from a
Competitive and Open Market Economy, and for Other Purposes:Hearings on
H.R. 5016 and H.R. 9144. Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstateand Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 33-37 (1977)(statement of Congressman Abner J. Mikva (Ill.), sponsor of the
unsuccessful Bills) (hereinafter cited as "Franchise Termination PracticesReform
Act Hearings"); Brown, Franchising-A FiduciaryRelationship, 49 TEx. L. REV.
650 (1971); Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights-Franchise
Cancellations, 1967 DUKE L.J. 465, 466-69 (1967).
10. H. BROWN, supra note 5, at 4-5, citing Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of
America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976); Semmes
Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 1970).
BROEHL, JR., JOHN DEERE'S COMPANY:

AND ITS TIMES

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss2/5
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high portion of his savings to obtain a business of his own.11 In
contrast with the franchisor, exposure to loss threatens the franchisee's livelihood, and his future business opportunities may be
diminished by a post-termination covenant with the franchisor not
to compete.1 2
The disparity in bargaining power alone need not invoke conflict between the franchisor and the franchisee, but the abuse of
this disparity certainly may. Indeed, the franchisor is often required under the Lanham Act 3 to exert its greater bargaining position since it cannot compromise the uniformity and quality of its
marketing system without potentially losing the right to its trademark. 4 However, the disparity in bargaining power readily lends
itself to abuse by the franchisor; the franchisee is at the mercy of
the franchisor for its success and existence. Typical abuses include
11. H. BROWN, supra note 5, at 5. A 1970 survey of more than 10,000 persons
who had recently purchased franchises revealed that 65% previously earned less
than $15,000 per year in their prior occupations. Minority groups and retired military personnel comprised a significant proportion of franchisees. Report of the
Senate Select Comm. on Small Business on the Impact of Franchisingon Small
Business, Based on HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Urban and Rural Economic
Development, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 13 (1970).
12. The validity of post-termination ancillary restraints in connection with
franchise agreements is fully analyzed in Gafnea v. Pasquale Food Co., BUSINESS
FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH)
8238 (Ala. 1984).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 et seq. (1982).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(e)(1) (1982) ("A verified petition to cancel a registration
of a mark ... may ... be filed by any person ... (e) at any time in the case of a
certification mark on the ground that the registrant (1) does not control, or is not
able legitimately to exercise control over, the use of such mark."). See further,
Smith, Trademarks and Antitrust: The Misuse Defense Under Section 33(b)(7)
of the Lanham Act, 4 HARV. J. OF L & PUB. POL. 161 (1981); Comment, A Balancing Approach; State FranchiseLaw and Federal Trademark Law, 24 BUFFALO L.
REV. 463 (1975); Comment, Antitrust Barriers to Franchising,61 GEO. L.J. 189
(1972); Collison, Trademarks-The Cornerstone of a Franchise System, 24 Sw.
L.J. 247 (1970); Comment, Liability of a Franchisorfor Acts of the Franchisee,41
S. CAL. L. REV. 143 (1967) (comparison of Lanham Act obligations to obligations
under agency relationship); for a critical discussion of the Lanham Act as a means
of justifying abuses of franchisees, see H. BROWN, supra note 5, at 123: "It may be
appropriate to reexamine the standards supposedly imposed upon franchising by
the Lanham Act. In actuality, that statute merely prescribes that a trademark
shall be cancelled if the registrant 'does not control, or is not able legitimately to
exercise control over, the use of such mark,' a provision quite different from a
'requirement' that the franchisor exercise quality control over its licensee." See
further, Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 576, n.11 (1972)("The
trademark may become a detrimental weapon if it is used to serve a harmful or
injurious purpose.").
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discriminatory treatment of competing franchises, financial penalties, product tying, and arbitrary or capricious termination and
non-renewal. 15
In the agricultural implement industry, where franchising is
the primary method of marketing, the abuse of franchisees by
franchisors has flourished. North Carolina's implement industry,
for example, was cited before Congress as a prime example of
abuses inherent in the general franchise method of marketing:
It is in [North Carolina] where a farm implement company
changed its whole method of distribution. As a result, a third generation of farm implement dealers-and as you are aware, many
of the small towns in both the South and the North have their
own farm implement dealer in each small town-was told that it
was, that the farm implement company was going to a new modus
of distribution, of having regional centers in the larger cities and
he was through. Obviously, such a distributional change affects
more than one isolated dealer. And as I say, here were three generations of a family that had been in the business and all of a
sudden, one day, that was the end of it with no ifs, ands or buts
[sic]."0
Short of sudden termination, abuse may take the form of requiring
the purchase of non-inventory items-such as computers for accounting purposes-through the franchisor at a greatly inflated
price or product tying where the franchisee is required to stock
slow-selling and unpopular implements as a prerequisite to stocking popular models. Accompanying each such requirement is the
7
threat of termination or non-renewal.1
Such abuse is difficult to halt. Judicial relief is often unavailable to the injured franchisee because courts have tended to favor
the competitive efficiencies of the franchising marketing method
15. H. BROWN, supra note 5, at 5; Franchise Termination Practices Reform
Act Hearing,supra note 9, at 40 (statement by Rep. Abner J. Mikva).
16. Franchise Termination Practices Reform Act Hearing, supra note 9, at
43 (statement by Rep. Abner J. Mikva).
17. These examples were drawn from actual situations in North Carolina and
were revealed in confidence by attorneys for implement dealerships. See further,
Smith Machinery Corp. v. Hesston, Inc., BUSINEss FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) 8324
(N.M. 1985) (representative-line forcing of new tractors and windrowers); Earley
Ford Tractor, Inc. v. Hesston Corp., BUSINEss FRANCHISE GUIDE 7940 (W.D. Mo.
1983) (full-line forcing of new tractors with right to deal in manufacturer's other
farm equipment).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss2/5
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over the interests of a single injured franchisee, 18 or have viewed
18. Providing remedies under antitrust laws for franchise-related abuses has
posed a difficult dilemma for the courts. On the one hand, excessive regulation of
a franchisor's ability to control its franchises may predictably result in an increase
in vertical integration-creating not only greater costs for the supplier, but barriers to entry as well, thereby hampering interbrand competition. See Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 n.26 (1977)("To the extent that a
per se rule prevents a firm from using the franchise system to achieve efficiencies
that it perceives as important to its successful operation, the rule creates an incentive for vertical integration into the distribution system, thereby eliminating
to that extent the role of the independent businessmen.") On the other hand,
providing immunity from antitrust laws to franchisors with regard to their franchisees hampers intrabrand competition by destroying competition within territories and for raw materials. See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 311 F.Supp. 847
(N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 855 (1972). See generally, Chisum, Policy Issues of Franchising,
14 Sw. U.L. REV. 156 (1984); Steutermann, Selected Antitrust Aspects of Trademark Franchising, 60 Ky. L.J. 638 (1972); Pollock, Antitrust Problems in
Franchising,15 N.Y. L.F. 106 (1969); Shuman, The Future of Franchisingand
Trade Regulation, 14 How. L.J. 60 (1968); Comment, Franchising + Antitrust =
Confusion: The Unfortunate Formula, 9 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 266 (1968).
Since the 1976 landmark decision of Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, franchisees have
been categorically unsuccessful in pursuing antitrust claims against franchisors.
The Sylvania holding differentiates between vertical restraints of trade, such as
between a franchisor and a franchisee, and horizontal restraints of trade, such as
between competitors marketing the same product. Under Sylvania, restraints of
trade among vertical competitors are to be viewed under the "rule of reason,"
which allows competitive restraints when justified by economic and practical considerations, while horizontal restraints continue to be viewed under the presumption of per se illegality. See Zeidman, The Rule of Reason in Franchisor-Franchisee Relationships, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 873, 880-81 (1978); Denger, Vertical
Restrictions: The Impact of Sylvania, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 908 (1977)(Denger was
the chairman and principal author of the ABA Antitrust Section Sherman Act
Comm. Task Force Monograph, Vertical Restrictions Limiting IntrabrandCompetition, cited repeatedly in the Sylvania opinion.). The Sylvania ruling has been
applied consistently to franchises in alleged instances of illegal tying under § 1 of
the Sherman Act: Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 1978-1 TRADE CAS.
(CCH) 61,870 (C.D. Cal. 1979), a/I'd, 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982); Principe v.
McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981);
Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); to exclusivity
under § 3 of the Clayton Act: Joyce Beverage v. Royal Crown Cola Co., 555 F.
Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); to territorial restraints: Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v.
Michelin Tire Corp., 483 F. Supp. 750 (D. Md. 1980), aff'd, 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981); Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic
Corp., 637 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981); Cowley v. Braden Industries, Inc., 613 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980);
American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975); and
to restraints arising under dual distributions: Shavrnock v. Clark Oil & Refining
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1986
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the franchise relationship as purely a matter of contract. 19 Administrative agencies charged with policing the marketplace, while proscribing some potential franchise abuse, generally provide no private right of action for the injured franchisee.20 The overwhelming
Co., BUSINESS FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) 1 8122 (6th Cir. 1984); O'Byrne v. Cheker
Oil Co., BUSINESS FRANCHISE GUIDE, (CCH) T 8127 (7th Cir. 1984). Very few exceptions can be cited: e.g. Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of America, 622 F.2d 1068 (2d
Cir. 1980)(finding violation of Sherman Act, stating that less restrictive measures
would have accomplished seller's reasonable objectives); In re Coca-Cola Co., 91
F.T.C. 517 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 642 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1981)(dual
distribution mere sham for competitive restraints). However, even among parties
to a franchise agreement, resale price maintenance remains a per se violation of
antitrust law. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
19. "Disparity in bargaining power does not in itself render a contract unenforceable where no coercion was applied to cause the weaker party to enter into
the contract." Melso v. Texaco, Inc., 1982-1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 64,625, at 73,412
(E.D. Pa. 1982); see also Murphy v. White Hen Pantry, [1980-1983 Transfer
Binder] BUSINESS FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH)
7716, at 12,817 (E.D. Wis. 1981);
Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 159 W. Va. 463, 223 S.E.2d 433 (1976); Wille v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 219 Kan. 755, 549 P.2d 903 (1976). See generally,
Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981).
Contract remedies may be available where termination or other franchise
abuse arises from a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealings,
Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 917 (1980); Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1980), or in situations involving unfairness, Picture Lake
Campground, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. Va. 1980), or commercially unreasonable conduct, Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 159 W. Va. 463,
223 S.E.2d 433 (1976). See generally, Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights-Franchise Cancellations, 1967 DuK L.J. 465; Fern & Klein, Restrictions on Termination and Nonrenewal of Franchises:A Policy Analysis, 36
Bus. LAW. 1041 (1981).
20. The Federal Trade Commission has promulgated far-reaching rules regarding the sale of franchises. "Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures," 16 C.F.R. § 436 (1978).
The Rule is intended to reduce the opportunity for unfair and deceptive practices
by requiring the disclosure of information relevant to the sale of a franchise. See
generally, Tifford, The Federal Trade Commission Trade Regulation Rule on
Franchisesand Business Opportunity Ventures, 36 Bus. LAW. 1051 (1981); Rudnick & Young, A Primer on the Regulation of FranchiseSales, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
453; Moore, Franchising:Probable Impact of the New Federal Trade Commission Rule, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 387 (1979). The Rule provides that the FTC may bring
actions in federal court for injunctive relief and civil penalties. See United States

v. Federal Energy Systems, Inc., BUSINESS FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) $ 8180 (C.D.
Cal. 1984); United States v. Philly Mignon Int'l, BUSINESS FRANCHISE GUIDE
(CCH)

81090 (D.N.J. 1984)($80,000 civil penalty); United States v. Ferrara

Foods, Inc.,

BUSINESS

FRANCHISE GUIDE

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss2/5
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majority of successful claims against the franchisor by the franchisee have arisen through federal and state legislation such as the
FMFA, specifically designed to curb franchise abuse. 2
civil penalty); United States v. Royco Automobile Parts, Inc., 46 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 26 (M.D. Fla. 1983)(freezing assets of corporation).
The FTC Rule, however, does not provide a private right of action. Freedman
v. Meldy's, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 658 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Chelson v. Oregonian Publishing Co., BUSINESS FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) 7652 (D. Or. 1981); Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Similarly, the Securities Exchange Commission may penalize fraudulent sales
of franchises, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-7811 (1976), but only in the narrow instances
where the investment in a franchise can be categorized as a type of interest where
management is principally provided by a third party other than the franchisee, or
even if the franchisee is active in management, where the control of capital rests
with a third party (the "risk capital" test). See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974). For an example of a franchise which met
this requirement, see American Gold & Diamond Corp. v. Kirkpatrick, BUSINESS
FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) 1 8155 (Alaska 1984). Most franchises, however, do not.
See, e.g., Beefy Trail, Inc. v. Beefy King Int'l, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,603
(M.D. Fla. 1972); McCoy v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
73,873 (D. Neb. 1972); Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635
(9th Cir. 1969).
A private right of action for fraud or misrepresentation in the sales of securities is provided in 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982). See, e.g. Thomas v. Roblin Industries,
Inc., 520 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir. 1975).
21. At the federal level, franchising in the petroleum marketing industry is
regulated by the Petroleum Marketing Practice Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801 et seq.
(1982), which forbids termination without good cause, id. at § 2802(a), and lists
situations constituting good cause, id. at § 2802(b)(2). Its provisions have given
rise to extensive commentary and extensive litigation. See, e.g. Finch, Judicial
Interpretationsof the Petroleum Marketing Practice Act: Strict Construction of
Remedial Legislation, 37 Bus. LAW. 141 (1981); Robinson, The Petroleum Marketing Practice Act-A Working Analysis (Pts. 1 & 2), 52 OKLA. BAR J. 1749,
2111 (1981); O'Brien, FederalLaws Affecting the Right of a Franchisorto Terminate or Not Renew a Franchise:Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1371 (1981); Corrigan, Retail Gasoline Franchise Terminations and
Nonrenewals under Title I of the Petroleum Marketing PracticesAct, 1980 DUKE
L.J. 522; Comment, Petroleum Marketing PracticesAct: Equalizing the Bargaining Power in the Franchise Relationship, 25 S.D.L. REV. 69 (1980).
Also at the federal level, automobile dealership franchises are protected
under the Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221 et seq. (1982).
In contrast to the PMPA, the Dealer's Day in Court Act, enacted in 1956, is a
"bare bones" statute creating a cause of action if the automobile manufacturer
fails "to act in good faith in performing . . . [the] provisions of the franchise, or
in terminating [the relationship]." Id. at § 1222. As in the case of the PMPA, the
Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act has been the subject of commentary and
extensive litigation. See, e.g., Brown, A Bill of Rights for Auto Dealer's, 12 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REV. 758 (1971); McCauley, Changing a Continuing Relationship
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FMFA

Legislative History

The FMFA was enacted to accomplish two purposes. First, it
was enacted to curb the abuse of agricultural implement dealerships by manufacturers and manufacturers' representatives. Abuse
of agricultural implement dealerships is so prevalent that the
North Carolina General Assembly, in enacting the FMFA, felt the
existence of abuse was a "foregone conclusion." It heard little testimony regarding the extent of the abuse and focused almost exclusively on remedies.2 2 Second, in response to the recent decline of
the farm economy, the FMFA was enacted to provide for the orderly termination of franchise relationships in the agricultural im23
plement industry.
Between a Large Corporationand Those Who Deal with It: Automobile Manufacturers, Their Dealers and the Legal System, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 483; Freed, A
Study of Dealer'sSuits Under the Automobile Dealer's FranchiseAct, 41 U. DET.
L.J. 245 (1964).
Including the FMFA, North Carolina now has three statutes applicable to
industry-specific franchising: beer and wine distribution, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 18B1116 et seq. (1985), and the automobile dealership industry, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
20-285 et seq. (1985), as well as a statute which governs the sale of "business
opportunities." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-94 to -100 (1985). See generally, Note, American Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters: Green Light to TerritorialSecurity for Automobile Dealers, 63 N.C. L. REV. 1080 (1985); Comment, Regulating the Sale of
Franchises: The Business Opportunity Approach, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 624
(1975).
Some states have opted for statutes which are not industry specific, but apply
to any franchise distribution system. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.180
(1976) and CAL. CORP. CODE § 31000-31516 (West Supp. 1976). For a general discussion of state laws regulating franchising, see Fine, Recent Developments in
State Law Affecting Franchising,1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 547; Eaton, State Regulation
of Franchises and Dealership Terminations: An Overview, 49 ANTITRUST L.J.
1331 (1980); Caffey, Franchise Terminationand Nonrenewal Legislation:Recent
Developments and Trends in State Legislation, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1343 (1980);
Chisum, State Regulation of Franchising:The Washington Experience, 48 WASH.
L. REV. 291 (1972).
22. Telephone interview with Representative David Redwine, sponsor of the
FMFA, Jan. 17, 1986.
23. Id. From 1981 to 1985, the number of farms in North Carolina dropped
from 90,000 to 76,000, while North Carolina farmers' net income slipped from
$1.14 billion in 1984 to approximately $750 million in 1985. For the national agricultural implement industry, the declining farm economy resulted in a loss of approximately $5 billion in the past five years. The loss included a 38% decrease in
the sale of tractors, and a 74% decrease in the sale of combines. The national
implement market now is suffering from a glut of new and used farm equipment;
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North Carolina is not alone in its concern for the agricultural
implement franchisee. Twenty-seven other states have statutes directly applicable to the industry.2 ' The North Carolina Act closely
parallels the South Carolina Act 25 and was in fact proposed in both
states by the Carolinas Farm and Power Equipment Dealer's Association, Inc. The Association sought passage of the acts in North
Carolina and South Carolina at the urging of farm implement dealers in counties near the South Carolina-Georgia border, who, after
passage of a similar act in Georgia in 1982,26 recognized the distinct advantages of protection under such legislation. 7 The acts
that the Association proposed in the Carolinas were modeled after
an Alabama Act passed in 1981.28
B.

Provisions of the FMFA

The FMFA is composed of seven sections: definitions, notice
provisions, buy-back requirements and terms, exceptions to the
buy-back provisions, uniform commercial practice, warranty obligations, and remedies for the failure to comply with the terms of
the Act. Each of these sections is described below.
estimated at 50% more implements then the market can absorb. In North Carolina, the number of implement dealerships declined 24% from 1984 to 1985. Jeffries, Farm Equipment Dealers Withering, News & Observer, March 18, 1986, at
D-1, col. 1.
24. ALA. CODE §§ 8-21-1 et seq. (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 70-819-826 (1979);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 42-133e et seq. (1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-133F (1972);
FLA. STAT. ANN.

§§ 686-40 et seq. (1984); GA.

CODE

§ 13-8-11 (1982);

IDAHO CODE

§§ 28-23-101 et seq. (1975); ILL. ANN.

STAT. §§ 5 1501 et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1983);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 322D (West 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-1001 et seq. (1976);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-481 et seq. (West 1975); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-853 et
seq. (Callaghan 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.05 (West 1974); 1977 Miss. Laws
Ch. 419; Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 407.850 et seq. (Vernon 1982); 1983 Mont. Laws Ch.
338; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 69-1501 et seq. (1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-27-1 et seq.
(1985); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-07-01 et seq (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 245

et seq. (West 1982); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.415 et seq. (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. §§
39-59-10 et seq. (Law. Co-op. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 37-5-1 et seq.
(1969); TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-13 (1977); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.61.E
(Vernon 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.98.010 et seq. (1976); Wis. STAT. ANN.

§ 135.045 (West 1974).
25. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-59-10 (Law. Co-op. 1984).
26. GA. CODE § 13-8-11 (1982).
27. Telephone interviews, Ed Biggs, vice president of the Carolinas Farm and
Power Equipment Dealer's Association, Inc., Jan. 7, 1986 and Representative
David Redwine, supra note 22.
28. ALA. CODE §§ 8-21 et seq. (1982).
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1. Definitions
a.

"FranchiseAgreement"

The statutory definition of "franchise agreement" delineates
the coverage of the FMFA. "Franchise agreement" is defined as "a
written or oral contract or agreement between a dealer and a
wholesaler, manufacturer, or distributor by which the dealer is
granted the right to sell or distribute goods or services, or use a
trade name, trademark, service mark, logo type, or advertising or
other commercial symbol. '2 9 This definition is consistent with the
majority of franchise legislation, which holds the trademark license
as the primary determination of the franchise relationship. 30 The
definition is broad in scope and includes a variety of marketing
schemes.3 1 Unlike other franchise-related statutes, payment of a li29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-180(3) (1985).
30. See, e.g., The Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2801(3)
(1982) ("The term 'franchisor' means a refiner or distributor (as the case may be)
who authorizes or permits, under a franchise, a retailer or distributor to use a
trademark in connection with the sale .

. . .").

A substantial amount of litigation

has arisen under similar statutes where the franchise agreement does not specifically provide a license to use a trade symbol. Cf., Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609
F.2d 873 (8th Cir), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1979) (the permitted usage of
franchisor's trademark indicated franchise relationship); Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974) (same);
Globe Liquor Co. v. Four Roses Distillers Co., 281 A.2d 19 (Del. Super.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 873 (1971) (same); People v. Kline, 110 Cal. App. 3d 587, 168
Cal. Rptr. 185 (1980) (supplying food, menu, and requiring identifiable kiosk constituted franchise); but see Automatic Comfort Corp. v. D. & R. Services, Inc.,
No. H-84-1069 (PDC) (D.C. Conn. filed Oct. 28, 1985); Cole v. Circle R. Convenience Store, Inc., No. 84-903-B (M.D. La. filed Aug. 30, 1985); Consumers Petroleum of Connecticut, Inc. v. Duhan, 38 Conn. Supp. 495, 452 A.2d 123 (1982)
(landlord-tenant relationship does not by itself create franchise relationship); 33
Flavors of Greater Delaware Valley, Inc. v. Bresler's 33 Flavors, Inc., 475 F. Supp.
217 (D.C. Del. 1979) (no franchise relationship where agent was engaged in business of licensing others to retail trade name products, and never sold products
himself); Business Incentives Co., v. Sony Corp. of America, 397 F. Supp. 63
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (no franchise relationship where manufacturer did not grant license to use trade name, but merely employed distributor to convince customers
to purchase manufacturer's products, and distributor performed a similar service
for 45 other manufacturers). See generally, Collison, Trademarks-The Cornerstone of a Franchise System, 24 Sw. L.J. 247 (1970).

31. For example, independent dealers or distributors operating without a formal franchise agreement are nonetheless covered by this definition. From a legal
standpoint, there is no difference between these types of dealers and the
franchised dealer. G. GLICKMAN, FRANCHISING § 3.04 (1985); J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:20 (1973); H. BROWN, supra note 5, at 13.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss2/5
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censing fee by the franchisee is not a prerequisite to coverage of
the Act.3 2 Contrary to the wishes of some franchisors, there are no
requirements of assistance in organizing, training, merchandising,
or management.3 3
b.

"Dealer"

A "dealer" is defined as "a person engaged in the business of
selling at retail farm, utility or industrial equipment, implements,
machinery, attachments, or repair parts. ' 34 Clearly, the Act only
applies to franchise relationships involving retail trade. A wholesaler would have no remedy against the manufacturer under this
statute.
The use of the word "person" in defining "dealer" is probably
not meant to limit the Act to sole proprietorships, although at
least one court has used such a construction in applying a similar
act.3 5 Under that construction, a corporation or partnership "engaged in the business of selling retail farm . . . equipment" would
not be able to avail itself of the benefits of the Act.36 There is no
rational basis for excluding every business entity other than sole
proprietorships from the scope of the Act; the formation of a partHowever, a "franchisor is to be distinguished from a 'distributor,' 'wholesaler,'
'jobber,' or other merchant middleman who is franchised and authorized by a
manufacturer, producer, or suppler of goods or commodities to sell chiefly to retailers, other merchants, or industrial, institutional, and commercial users mainly
for resale or business use." C. ROSENFIELD, THE LAW OF FRANCHISING § 15 (1970).
32. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.220 (Supp. 1972)(defining a franchise
as "an agreement granting another the use of license ... in which the franchisee
is required to pay a franchise fee.")
33. The International Franchise Association, a trade association representing
the interests of the franchisor, has defined franchising as "a continuing relationship in which the franchisor provides a licensed privilege to do business, plus assistance in organizing, training, merchandising, and management in return for a
consideration from the franchisee." FranchiseCompany Data for Equal Opportunity in Business, United States Department of Commerce (July 1969 p. VIII).
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-180(2) (1985).
35. Bunch v. Artec Int'l Corp., 559 F. Supp. 961, 968 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)(interpreting California Franchise Relations Act, CAL. CORP. CODE § 31000-31516
(1976)).
36. Compare, for example, § 66-180(2) with S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-59-10(3)
(1984), after which the FMFA was modeled: "'Retailer' means any person engaged in the business of selling and retailing farm implements .... The term

also includes any person engaged in such business, his heirs, personal representatives, or his guardian or the major stockholder of the business." (emphasis
added).
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nership or incorporation does not necessarily demonstrate a level
of business sophistication sufficient to remove the franchisee from
the need for the Act's protection. Furthermore, it is clear from the
"four corners" of the Act that the General Assembly envisioned
the Act applying to all retail franchisees, regardless of the legal
nature of their business organization. In § 66-182(5), for example,
the notice provisions, the words "withdrawal of an individual proprietor, partner, major shareholder, or manager of the dealership,
or a substantial reduction in interest of a partner or major shareholder . .." certainly indicate that the definition of "dealer" is to
37
be broader than sole proprietorships.
c.

"Supplier"

A "supplier" is defined as a "wholesaler, manufacturer, or distributor who enters into a franchise agreement with a dealer."38
d.

"Inventory"

The term "inventory" is defined as "farm, utility, or industrial
equipment, implements, machinery, attachments, or repair parts.
These terms do not include heavy construction equipment. '39 This
definition must be read in conjunction with § 66-181, which states
that "[t]he terms 'utility' and 'industrial', when used to refer to
equipment, implements, machinery, attachments, or repair parts,
shall have the meaning commonly used and understood among
dealers and suppliers of farm equipment as a usage of trade in accordance with G.S. 25-1-205(2)."10
Whereas the definition specifically excludes heavy construction equipment from the scope of the Act, it does not refer to the
sale of lawn and garden equipment. 4' Though the Act is silent on
37. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-183(b) (1985) (".
holder of the dealer, if the dealer is a corporation, .

38. N.C.

GEN. STAT.

. .

or the majority stock-

.

§ 66-180(6) (1985).

39. Id. at § 66-180(4).
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-205(2) (1985) states:
A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.
The existence and scope of such a usage are to be proved as facts. If it is
established that such a usage is embodied in a written trade code or similar writing the interpretation of the writing is for the court.
41. Compare "'Inventory' means farm implements, machinery,.
and yard
and garden equipment, attachments or repair parts." S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-59-
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this, the legislative history of the Act strongly suggests that the
lawn and garden equipment industry is exempt from the Act's coverage. As the Act 4 2 was making its way through the House Committee on Agriculture, an amendment was offered specifically to
include lawn and garden machinery. However, upon strong opposition from major manufacturers and national hardware store chains,
the amendment was tabled.
The omission of lawn and garden equipment introduces vagueness as to the exact inventory covered by the Act. Certainly there
are dual purpose implements-such as chain saws-that, if sold to
a farmer, are farm implements, but if sold to a homeowner, are
lawn and garden implements. In rural communities, the farm machinery dealership typically is a source of lawn and garden implements as well. The statute provides no clear method or scheme of
allocation for such dual purpose items upon termination.
Evidence as to the character of the implement, whether farm
or lawn and garden, may be adduced from the sales tax imposed on
the sale of that type implement by the franchisee. Under the
North Carolina Retail Sales Tax law, the sale of "machinery to
farmers" is subjected to a one percent sales tax43 as opposed to a
three percent tax for general retail items.'" The retailer has the
duty of ascertaining whether the customer is a farmer, and if so,
recording the sale separately in the store's books.' 5 It is conceivable that upon termination of a business which dealt with dual purpose items, one could determine from the franchisee's books the
proportion of such items typically sold to farmers, and thus subject
a proportional share of the remaining inventory to the coverage of
the Act.""
10(4) (1984).
42. H.B. 762 (1985).

43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.4(1)(g) (1985).
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.4(1) (1985).
45. Id. at § 105-164.4(5). The statute gives the store owner little guidance in
exactly how to determine whether a customer is a farmer or not. The courts have
indicated that the taxpayer claiming an exemption has the burden of showing
that he comes within that exception. Deep River Farms, Ltd. v. Lynch, 58 N.C.
App. 165, 292 S.E.2d 752 (1982).
46. Similarly, another approach might allow a dealer who sold greater than a
certain percentage of his inventory for agricultural use to be covered entirely by
the Act.
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"Termination"

"Termination" of a franchise agreement is defined as the "termination, cancellation, nonrenewal, or noncontinuance of the
agreement."1 7 As specified in § 66-183, the Act applies not only to
unilateral terminations of a franchise by the franchisor, but also to
terminations "by either party."
2. Notice Provisions
In a manner consistent with other North Carolina franchise
regulation acts and agricultural implement franchise acts of other
states, the FMFA requires notice of termination, cancellation, nonrenewal, or noncontinuance of a franchise agreement.4" The Act
provides that:
Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, a supplier
who terminates a franchise agreement with a dealer shall notify
the dealer of the termination not4 9less than 90 days prior to the
effective date of the termination.

The Act further permits the supplier to "immediately terminate"
the agreement at any time after the occurrence of one or more enumerated events. Immediate termination may be invoked if:
(1) A petition under bankruptcy or receivership law has been filed
against the dealer;
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-180(7) (1985).
48. In the North Carolina Automobile Dealer's Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-285
et seq. (1985), the definition of "termination" gave rise to litigation in Mazda
Motors of America, Inc. v. Southwestern Motors, Inc., 36 N.C. App. 1, 243 S.E.2d
793 (1978), afJ'd in part, rev'd in part, 296 N.C. 357, 250 S.E.2d 250 (1979). In §
20-305(6) of the Automobile Dealer's Act, the franchisor was required to supply
notice of pending "termination, cancellation or nonrenewal." In Mazda, the parties mutually agreed to terminate the franchise, and the franchisor did not provide the notice required by the statute. The court of appeals held that the Act
plainly required notice even though the termination was mutual. 36 N.C. App. at
14, 243 S.E.2d at 802. The supreme court, however, reversed the court of appeals
on this point, holding that to require notice in the case of mutual termination led
to absurd results. The supreme court read the statutory language to apply only to
unilateral terminations. 296 N.C. at 362, 250 S.E.2d at 253.
The FMFA language differs from that of the Dealer's Act only with the addition of the word "noncontinuance." Arguably, a mutual termination is a "noncontinuance," and reflects a legislative intent to include mutual terminations within
the scope of the Act's notice requirement.
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-182 (1985).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss2/5
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(2) the dealer has made an intentional misrepresentation with the
intent to defraud the supplier;
(3) Default by the dealer under a chattel mortgage or other security agreement between the dealer and the supplier;
(4) Close out or sale of a substantial part of the dealer's business
related to the handling of goods; the commencement or dissolution or liquidation of the dealer if the dealer is a partnership or
corporation; or a change, without the prior written approval of
the supplier, in the location of the dealer's principal place of business under the agreement;
(5) Withdrawal of an individual proprietor, partner, major shareholder, or manager of the dealership, or a substantial reduction in
interest of a partner or major shareholder, without the prior written consent of the supplier; or
(6) Revocation or discontinuance of any guarantee of the dealer's
present or future obligation to the supplier.50
The dealer is required by the Act to notify the supplier of its intent to terminate a franchise agreement "not less than 30 days
prior to the effective date of termination." 5 1
Notice of termination by either party must be "in writing and
shall be by certified mail or personally delivered to the recipient."
It must contain:
(1) A statement of intention to terminate the franchise,
(2) A statement of the reasons for the termination, and
(3) The date on which the termination takes effect.52
The notice requirements, aside from adopting and codifying
common law and the Uniform Commercial Code notice require50. Id. The provisions allowing for notice-free termination are partially
drawn from other North Carolina franchise-related acts. Provisions (1), (4) and
(5), generally pertaining to dissolution or substantial alterations in the dealer's
business, appear in substantially similar form in the N.C. Automobile Dealer Act,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-305(6)(c)(III)(A) and (B) (1985), and the N.C. Beer and
Wine Distributor Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-1205(f)(1) and (2) (1985). Provisions
(2), (3) and (6), generally pertaining to circumstances where a dealer breaches an
obligation to its supplier, are not found elsewhere in North Carolina franchise
law. In this regard, the Act appears to recognize the necessity for the franchisor to
protect the integrity of its trademark and distribution system under the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(e)(1) (1982). Cf.supra note 14 and accompanying text.
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-182(b) (1985).
52. Id. at § 66-182(c). These requirementa are identical to those found in the
North Carolina Automobile Dealer Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-305(6)(c)(2)(I), (II)
and (III) (1985).
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ments, 53 reflect a legislative view that the Act should protect the
legitimate expectations of both the franchisor and the franchisee.
The disparity in the times required for notice reflects the relative
economic position of the franchisor compared with the franchisee.5" The notice provision has the practical effect of allowing a
terminated dealer ninety days in which to obtain another supplier
or, if necessary, to liquidate assets.
The Act is silent in regard to the consequences of a failure to
provide proper notice prior to termination. Based on similar statutes, the typical remedy is to stay the termination until notice is
perfected.56 At least one court allowed a termination to occur in
spite of insufficient notice, but required the franchisor to account
for and compensate the franchisee for income earned until the
statutory notice period tolled."
3.

The Repurchase Requirement and its Terms

The most significant provision of the FMFA is the obligation
that it places upon the supplier to repurchase inventory from the
dealer at the termination, cancellation, nonrenewal, or noncontinuance of the franchise agreement. The Act requires the
following:
Whenever a dealer enters into a franchise agreement in which the
dealer agrees to maintain an inventory, and the agreement is terminated by either party, the supplier shall repurchase the dealer's
inventory as provided in this Article unless the dealer chooses to
57
keep the inventory.
53. U.C.C. § 2-309(3) provides that "termination of a contract by one party
except on the happening of an agreed event requires that reasonable notification
be received by the other party and an agreement dispensing with notification is
invalid if its operation would be unconscionable." For cases holding that common
law requires notice prior to termination, see Ken-Rad Corp. v. R.C. Bohannan,
Inc., 80 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1935); Foster-Porter Enterprises, Inc. v. De Mare, 198
Md. 20, 81 A.2d 325 (1951); See generally, Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract
Termination Rights-FranchiseCancellations, 1967 DUKE L.J. 465, 479-81.
54. See Fern & Klein, Restrictions on Termination and Nonrenewal of
Franchises: A Policy Analysis, 36 Bus. LAW. 1041, 1043 (1981).
55. See, e.g., Mazda, 36 N.C. App. at 15, 243 S.E.2d at 802 (under N.C. Automobile Dealer Act); Sutton v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 539 F. Supp. 658 (C.D. Cal.
1982) (under PMPA, 15 U.S.C. § 2804 (1982)).
56. Seegmiller v. Western Men, Inc., 20 Utah 2d 352, 537 P.2d 892 (1968).
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-183 (1985). The rationale of the requirement that
the dealer agree to maintain an inventory was described in In re Hausauer Implement Co., BUSINEss FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) 1 8159 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1983). There,
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The inventory must be repurchased within ninety days of the termination, 58 and payment in full must be made to the dealer within
thirty days after receipt of the repurchased inventory.5 9 If the
dealer has outstanding debts to the supplier, then the repurchase
amount may be credited to the dealer's account.8
The supplier's duty to repurchase is also invoked when the
"dealer or the majority stockholder of the dealer, if the dealer is a
corporation, dies or becomes incompetent.""1 In such cases, the
duty to repurchase arises at the option of the "heir, personal representative, or guardian of the dealer, or the person who succeeds to
the stock of the majority stockholder. 62 The option must be exercised within one year of the deemed termination. 3
The terms of the repurchase requirement are set forth as:
(1) One hundred percent (100%) of the net cost of all new,
unused, undamaged, and complete farm, utility, and industrial
equipment, implements, machinery, and attachments, less a reasonable allowance for deterioration attributable to weather conditions at the dealer's location;
in applying language substantially similar to the FMFA, the court stated that:
The foregoing provision was intended to remedy the problem which
arises when a dealer has been required by the terms of the franchise
agreement to invest in purchases of equipment in order to maintain a
specified level of inventory parts or machinery and thereby using cash
assets that would ordinarily be available for operating expenses. In such
instances, the manufacturer shares the fault should the situation arise
where the dealer is unable to continue in business ....

This is to be

contrasted from the situation where the dealer voluntarily purchases
equipment and is under no specific obligation to maintain a certain level
of parts or whole machines. In this latter situation, the manufacturer is
less at fault should a failure occur in the dealer's business. It is the opinion of this Court that section 51-07-01 of the [North Dakota] Code is not
applicable in instances where the written agreement does not specifically
require a dealer to maintain a stock of parts or whole machines.
Id. at 14,388.
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-184(a) (1985).
59. Id. at § 66-184(e).
60. Id.
61. Id. at § 66-184(b). This provision is found in most of the agricultural
implement dealership acts of other states (all but California, Colorado, Connecticut, New Mexico, North Dakota, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin, see supra
note 24) and in the franchise legislation guidelines established by the Farm and
Industrial Equipment Institute, a trade association representing the interests of
implement manufacturers.
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-184(b) (1985).
63. Id.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1986

19

Campbell
Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 5
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:289

(2) Ninety percent (90%) of the current net price of all new,
unused, undamaged repair parts; and
(3) Eighty-five percent (85%) of the current net price of all
new, unused, undamaged, superseded repair parts.64
The supplier is further required to pay for the shipping of the repurchased inventory from the dealer's location and may be assessed an additional five percent over the net price of the repair
parts repurchased to compensate for their handling and shipping,
65
unless the supplier opts to load and ship them itself.
The repurchase provision favors the dealer in termination. For
example, the provision specifically applies regardless of whether
the supplier or the dealer initiates the termination," providing the
dealer, who chooses to retire or liquidate, a guaranteed market for
its inventory. The Act has no provision excusing the supplier from
its repurchase requirement even if the termination was precipitated by dealer misconduct such as trademark violations.6 7 One of
the very few reported cases ever arising under any of the twentyeight farm implement franchise acts, Hall GMC, Inc. v. Crane Car64. Id. at § 66-184(b). The South Carolina Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-59-10 et
seq. (1984), does not require the supplier to repurchase any inventory sold to the
dealer more than 36 months prior to notice of termination. Id. at § 39-59-50(8).
The North Carolina General Assembly chose not to include this exemption, but
rather opted to allow the supplier to deduct a "reasonable allowance for deterioration attributable to weather conditions at the dealer's location." Telephone interview with Ed Biggs, supra note 27.
The percentages set forth by the FMFA for determination of the repurchase
price to the supplier are fairly standard in comparison to the implement franchise
acts of other states. Some states, however, require repurchase at a "fair and reasonable compensation," CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-133(f)(b) (1972). See also, Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 135.045 (1974). Others differ from the FMFA, which requires the
supplier to repurchase at 100% of the "current net cost," by requiring repurchase
at 100% of the "current net price." See ALA. CODE § 8-21-3 (1982); 1977 Miss.
Laws ch. 419(3); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.853(1) (1982). The "current net cost" is
defined as the "price the dealer paid the supplier," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-180(5)
(1985), whereas the "current net price" is defined as the "price listed in the supplier's price list or catalog." Id. at § 66-180(1).
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-184(d) (1985).
66. Id. at § 66-183.
67. While no authority exists that denied a dealer coverage of an implement
franchise act because of misconduct, Hall GMC, Inc. v. Crane Carrier Co., BusiNESS FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH)
7965 (N.D. 1983) considered whether the dealer
had removed himself from the coverage of the North Dakota act by fraud, breach
of faith, estoppel, or waiver. The court did not find any of these actions, and thus
never reached the issue of whether the dealer's rights could be lost. See infra text
accompanying notes 68-75.
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rier Co.,68 illustrates the potentially harsh result of applying such a
provision.
In Hall, a dealer of trucks terminated its franchise relationship with its franchisor.6 9 The dealer admitted that it did so primarily because of a downward trend in the economy and a consequential slowing of the heavy equipment industry.7 0 The North
Dakota Franchise Act 71 provides that the franchisor is required to
repurchase a dealer's current model inventory upon discontinuance
of the franchise relationship. Immediately prior to providing notice
to the franchisor of its intent to terminate, the dealer, upon the
advice of its attorney, traded its inventory for current models so
as
7 21
to be certain to fall within the coverage of the Franchise Act.
The North Dakota Supreme Court not only held that the
Franchise Act required the franchisor to repurchase the dealer's
inventory,73 but the court refused to find fraud, estoppel or waiver
on the part of the dealer. 7 ' The court simply stated that "[a] general principle of contract law is that existing law at the time of the
formation of a contract becomes part of the contract. . . . Consequently, we conclude that the statutory provisions of [the
Franchise Act] must be read into the distributor agreement and
any contrary contractual provisions must be severed. '7 5
4.

Exceptions to the Repurchase Requirement

Certain inventory items are exempted from the supplier's duty
to repurchase under the FMFA. These items are:
(1) A repair part with a limited storage life or otherwise subject to
deterioration, such as gaskets or batteries, except for industrial
'press on' or industrial pneumatic tires;
(2) A single repair part that is priced as a set of two or more
items;
(3) A repair part that, because of its condition, is not resalable as
a new part without repackaging or reconditioning;
(4) An item of inventory for which the dealer does not have title
free of all claims, liens, and encumbrances other than those of the
68. BUSINESs FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) 7965 (N.D. 1983).
69. Id. at 13,590.
70. Id.
71. N.D. CENT.CODE §§ 51-07-01 et seq. (1981).
72. BUSINEss FRANCHISE GUIDE at 13,590.
73. Id. at 13,590-91.
74. Id. at 13,591-92.
75. Id. at 13,593.
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supplier;
(5) Any inventory that the dealer chooses to keep;
(6) Any inventory that was ordered by the dealer after either
party's receipt of notice of termination of the franchise agreement; and
(7) Any inventory that was acquired by the dealer from a source
76
other than the supplier.
While these exceptions to the supplier's repurchase duty appear to have fair and practical bases, the seventh exception, which
relieves the supplier from repurchasing inventory "acquired from a
source other than the supplier," has been criticized as creating a
potential loophole in the protection envisioned by the Act.7 7 For
example, a supplier may potentially evade the repurchase requirement by requiring the dealer to purchase inventory only from another approved supplier, such as an independent wholesale distributor of the supplier's products. Under a literal application of the
exception, such inventory would be exempt from the repurchase
requirement because, although required by the supplier, it was
purchased from "a source other than the supplier. '78 A position
more consistent with the intent of the repurchase requirement
would be to require the supplier to repurchase all inventory that it
had required, regardless of its source.79

76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-185 (1985). While this provision is substantially similar to most implement dealership acts of other states, it differs from some by not
exempting the supplier from repurchase of inventory acquired 24 or 36 months
prior to notice of termination. California, Connecticut, Florida, Nebraska, New
Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota and Texas join North Carolina in not allowing this exception. Some acts allow for inventory which is "not current" to be
exempted from the supplier's repurchase obligation. GA. CODE § 13-8-16(c)(4)
(1982); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 19.98.010 (1976). The Farm and Industrial
Equipment Institute, a trade association for implement manufacturers, offers proposed legislation that incorporates exceptions both for inventory items acquired
24 month prior to notice of termination and for non-current inventory. Illinois has
adopted both of these terms. ILL. ANN. STAT. §§ 5 1507(9) and (12) (1983). Cf.
supra note 64.
77. Chisum, State Regulation of Franchising:The Washington Experience,
48 WASH. L. REV. 291, 378 (1972).
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-185(7) (1985).
79. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-133f(b) (1972) (requires "compensation
by the franchisor for the franchisee's inventory ... purchased by the franchisee
from the franchisor or its approved sources.").
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Uniform Commercial Practice

The Act provides that its terms do not "affect a security interest of the supplier in the inventory of the dealer."80 Furthermore,
the repurchase of the inventory is not subject to the bulk sales provisions of Article 6 of Chapter 25 of the North Carolina General
Statutes."1
6.

Warranty Obligations and Product Liability Indemnity

As well as providing guidance upon the termination of
franchise agreements, the FMFA also provides a statutory procedure for settling (1) warranty obligations and (2) indemnity in
products liability actions.82 In providing for the first, warranty obligations, the Act sets forth a specific procedure and timetable for
payment by the supplier to the dealer for approved warranty repairs. In providing for the second, indemnity for product liability
actions, the Act adopts the position of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts8 3 and the Restatement (Second) of Agency. 4
In regard to warranty obligations, the Act establishes a procedure by which the dealer may seek approval from the supplier
prior to performing warranty repairs or replacements. The sup80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-186 (1985). The inclusion of this provision minimizes
the impact that the repurchase provision has in the normal course of business
between the supplier and the dealer by allowing the secured transactions provision of Article 25 (Uniform Commercial Code) of the General Statutes to apply in
full force. Similar language is found in many implement dealership acts of other
states, namely Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas and Washington. See supra note 24.
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-186 (1985). The purpose of the bulk sales provisions
of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-60-101 et seq. (1985), as set forth in the Official Comment,
is to minimize the opportunity for a merchant to defraud creditors by selling the
entire assets of a business, and then abscond with the proceeds. The bulk sales
provisions require the transferee to provide creditors with notice of the transfer.
Id. at § 25-6-105. Under the FMFA, exempting the repurchase transaction from
the provisions of the bulk sales act frees the supplier from having to notify all of
the dealer's creditors in order to have an effective transaction. Similar language is
found in many implement dealership acts of other states, namely Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee,
Texas and Washington. See supra note 24.
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-187 (1985).
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) and § 400, comment d (1965).
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 439 (1958).
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plier, upon receipt of such a request, must respond within thirty
days. If the request is not specifically disapproved in writing
within thirty days after its receipt, it is deemed approved. Once a
request is approved, the supplier must reimburse the dealer within
85
thirty days for parts and services rendered.
With regard to product liability indemnification, the Act provides that:
Whenever a supplier and a dealer enter into a franchise agreement, the supplier shall indemnify and hold harmless the dealer
against any judgment for damages or any settlement agreed to by
the supplier, including court costs and a reasonable attorney's fee,
arising out of a complaint, claim, or lawsuit, including negligence,
strict liability, misrepresentation, breach of warranty, or rescission of the sale, to the extent the judgment or settlement relates
to the manufacture, assembly, or design of inventory, or other
conduct of the supplier beyond the dealer's control.86
This provision settles the issue of whether the franchisor or
87
the franchisee is the "seller" for the purposes of product liability.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, entitled "Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer," states that "[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer . . . is
subject to liability
.
8 Comment d of § 400 of the Restatement defines a seller as "one [who] puts out a chattel . . . under
his name or affixes to it his trade name or trademark."8 9 The
FMFA recognizes that the franchisor, not the franchisee, should be
subject to § 402A, since the franchisor is ultimately responsible for
the quality and safety of the product.
Additionally, the Act eases the showing required by the dealer
to establish a right of indemnity under the principle of agency law
which requires a principal to indemnify an agent when the agent is
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-187(a) (1985).
86. Id. at § 66-187(b).
87. See generally, Carr, Liability of Franchisors and Franchisees for the
Sale of Defective Products-Placingthe Burden with the Blame, FRANCHisE L.J.
3 (Winter 1985). Cf., Kosters v. Seven-Up Co., 595 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1979); Grizzi

v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1971); Carter v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co.,
360 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc., 75 Ill. 2d 393, 389
N.E.2d 155 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1063 (1980); Kasel v. Remington Arms
Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972).
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A).
89. Id. at § 400, comment d.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss2/5
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held liable for acts the principal required it perform.9" Without
this provision of the Act, the dealer would be required to show (1)
that an agency exists, (2) that the franchisor has a duty to indemnify, and (3) that the tortious conduct was not of its own making. 9 1
The Act alleviates the first and second requirement; agency is established by the existence of a franchise agreement 9 2 and the supplier has a statutory duty to indemnify under the provisions of the
Act.93 The dealer must, however, show the third element-that the
"conduct was beyond the dealer's control."94
'
7. Remedies for Failure to Comply with the Provisions of
the FMFA.
Under the FMFA, if the supplier fails or refuses to comply
with the repurchase requirements of the Act within the prescribed
ninety days following termination,95 it becomes civilly liable for:
one hundred percent (100%) of the current net price of the inventory, any freight charges paid by the dealer, the dealer's reasonable attorney's fees and court costs, and interest on the current net price of the inventory computed at the legal rate of
interest from the 91st day after termination of the franchise
agreement. 96
Additionally, any person who suffers monetary loss because he refuses to accede to a "proposal for an arrangement that, if consummated, is in violation of this Article" may seek injunctive relief
from further violations and monetary damages, and the cost of the
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.9 7 The statute of limitations for violations of the provisions of the Act is four years after
the violation is or reasonably should have been discovered. 98
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 439.

91. Id. at § 439(a), (b) and (c).
92. N.C. GEN. STAT § 66-187(b) ("Whenever a supplier and a dealer enter into
a franchise agreement ...").
93. Id. (" . . . the supplier shall indemnify and hold harmless the dealer
against any judgment for damages . .

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-184(c) (1985).
Id. at § 66-188(a).
Id. at § 66-188(b).
Id. at § 66-188(c).
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ANALYSIS OF SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE ACT

Although the FMFA is the twenty-eighth statute of its type in
the United States, very few cases have ever arisen under such an
act and very little scholarly commentary exists to date. Thus, analysis of various provisions of the FMFA must, to a great extent, be
extrapolated from analogous statutes governing franchises in other
industries, and such analysis must necessarily be limited to that
which the courts have chosen to comment upon.
A.

Retroactive Coverage

Perhaps the issue of greatest concern to farm implement
franchisors, and the issue most likely to be litigated, is the possibility that the Act may be retroactive and thus applicable to
franchise agreements formed prior to the effective date of the Act,
but terminated thereafter. The Act itself is silent as to its retroactive application, merely stating that it shall "become effective October 1, 1985." 99 At issue are first, whether the legislature intended
the Act to apply retroactively and second, if such an intent did in
fact exist, whether the Act overcomes the constitutional proscription against the impairment of contracts. 100
The sparse recorded legislative history regarding the Act provides no insight, as to its retroactivity. The Act's sponsor indicated
verbally that his impression was that the Act would apply
retroactively. 10
In predicting whether the FMFA applies retroactively, one
may look to the North Carolina Court of Appeals' analysis in
Mazda Motors of America, Inc. v. Southwestern Motors, Inc.102 of
a similar franchise act, the North Carolina Automobile Dealer
Act.10 3 There, the appellants contested a superior court holding
that an amendment to the Automobile Dealer Act requiring notice
of termination 0 ' could not be constitutionally applied to preexisting franchise agreements. 10 5 The agreement between the parties
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-188(2) (1985).
100. U.S. CONST. art. I § 10 c. 1.
101. Telephone interview, Representative David Redwine, supra note 22.
102. 36 N.C. App. 1, 243 S.E.2d 793 (1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 296
N.C. 357, 250 S.E.2d 250 (1979).
103. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-285 et seq. (1975)(the Act has since been

amended).
104. Id. at § 20-305(6).
105. 36 N.C. App. at 6, 243 S.E.2d at 798.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss2/5
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was entered into in May 1971; the amendment to the statute was
enacted in 1973; and the termination was attempted in June
1974.106 The court of appeals reversed the conclusion of the lower
court, holding instead that the act's retroactive application
would
10 7
not constitute a unconstitutional impairment of contracts.
The court of appeals prefaced its holding both by noting that
the United States Constitution grants contracting parties a "qualified and not an absolute right" from impairment 0 8 and by noting
that a regulation on economic relations was subjected to a relaxed
scrutiny when under constitutional attack.'0 9 The court then applied a two part analysis to determine (1) whether the act indicated in its terms a legislative intent to apply the act retroactively,
and (2) whether the retroactive application of the act would impermissibly disturb "core expectations" of the parties.1 10
The determination that the Automobile Dealer Act was intended by the legislature to apply retroactively was easily settled.
The Act specifically stated that "[t]he provisions of this Article
shall be applicable to all franchises and contracts existing between
dealers and manufacturers, factory branches, and distributors at
the time of its ratification, and to all such future franchises and
contracts."'
The "core expectation" requirement was treated with equal
brevity. "It has long been recognized," the court stated, "that existing state laws are to be read into contracts in order to fix the
obligations of the parties."'1 2 Further, the United States Supreme
Court has held that:
Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix
obligations as between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against
impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government .. .
which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good
106. Id. at 11, 243 S.E.2d at 801.
107. Id. at 13, 243 S.E.2d at 802.
108. Id. at 7, 243 S.E.2d at 798, citing Morris v. Holshouser, 220 N.C. 293, 17

S.E.2d 115 (1941).
109. 36 N.C. App. at 12, 243 S.E.2d at 801, citing Home Building & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 435 (1934); The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91
HARV. L. REv. 1, 89 (1977).
110. 36 N.C. App. at 12, 243 S.E.2d at 801.

111. N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 20-307 (1985).

112. 36 N.C. App. at 12, 243 S.E.2d at 801.
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order of society. 13
Without further analysis, the court concluded the requirement of
notice of intention to terminate did not strike at the core expectations of the contract to a constitutionally impermissible level.114
In applying this analysis to the FMFA, a similar conclusion
cannot be predicted. Under the first prong of the Mazda analysis,
the FMFA fails to raise the presumption that the legislature intended the Act to apply retroactively. The Act contains no language, beyond its effective date, indicating its application." 5
Second, even assuming arguendo that the Act did manifest the
legislative intent to apply retroactively, it may fail under the second prong of the Mazda test as well. The Mazda court held that a
retroactively applied statute must not strike at the core expectations of the parties"' and concluded that a provision which merely
required the parties to provide each other notice of an intention to
terminate the franchise agreement did not impermissibly alter core
expectations. 1 7 In contrast, the FMFA, if applied retroactively,
would require the supplier, in repurchasing the dealer's inventory,
to expend a potentially great sum of money that had not been anticipated at the time the franchise agreement was entered."18 Al113. Id., citing Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 435.
114. Id. at 12, 243 S.E.2d at 802.
115. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-188(2) (1985). Even where a statute is silent as to
its retroactive application, some courts have resorted to grammatical analysis to
determine legislative intent. See, e.g., McDonnell v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,
BUSINESS FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH)
8077 at 14,024 (D.C. Minn. 1983)(finding
"clearly prospective language" in that the definition of 'franchise' . . . uses the
present and not the past tense of verbs: 'a contract or agreement ... by which a
franchise is granted the right. .. ' "). Similarly, the FMFA, in defining "franchise
agreement," uses the present tense: " . . . by which the dealer is granted the right
", N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-180(3) (1985) (emphasis added), and later:
[w]henever a dealer enters into a franchise agreement ....
" Id. at § 66183(3)(emphasis added).
116. 36 N.C. App. at 12, 243 S.E.2d at 801.
117. Id. at 12, 243 S.E.2d at 802. Indeed, under similar analysis, a number of
courts have determined that the common law requires that adequate notice is
always implied in a contract, and therefore a notice provision is not an impairment at all. See, e.g., A.R. Dervaes Co., Inc. v. Houdaille, Inc., BUSINESS
FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) 7803 at 13,071 (Del. 1981); Gianelli Distribution Co. v.
Beck & Co., BUSINESS FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) 8456 (Cal. App. 1985). Cf. supra
note 53 and cases cited therein.
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-183 (1985). For example, the supplier in Hall GMC,
Inc. v. Crane Carrier Co., BUSINESS FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) 1 7966 (N.D. 1983),
was required to expend $52,223.97 to repurchase inventory under N.D. CENT.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss2/5

28

19861

Ridgeway: The North
Carolina Farm Machinery Franchise Act: Its Provisions,
FARM MACHINERY FRANCHISES

though the Mazda holding does not provide analysis sufficient to
determine whether such an impairment of the supplier's interests
would rise to the level of "striking at a core expectation," ' 19 the
argument certainly could be made, especially in light of the failure
of the Act to provide a legislative intention of retroactivity. 12 °
Assuming that the FMFA is not applicable to preexisting contracts, the issue immediately arises as to whether, or under what
conditions, a preexisting obligation can be transformed into an new
obligation created after the effective date of the Act. The issue has
arisen most frequently in regard to renewals of contracts, modifications of contracts, and the occurrence of events inherently altering
contracts.
Courts have consistently held that renewals of franchise agreements constitute the formation of a new contract, and thus any
renewal occurring after the effective date of the Act is subject to
its provisions. 121 This rule applies to all but the most perfunctory
renewals; 22 any renewal which alters requirements such as increasing yearly minimum purchase quotas12 3 or bearing language such
as "this agreements cancels or supersedes any preceding agreeCODE §§ 51-07-01 et seq. (1981).
119. 36 N.C. App. at 12, 243 S.E.2d at 801.
120. While no court has ruled on the constitutionality of a retroactive buyback provision, a number of courts have applied analysis very similar to the
Mazda analysis to franchise statutes. These primarily examine the retroactive effect of notice provisions and "good cause" requirements. See, e.g., Fireside
Chrysler-Plymouth Mazda v. Chrysler, BUSINESS FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) 8301
(Ill. App. 1985); McDonnell v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, BUSINESS FRANCHISE
GUIDE (CCH) 1 8077 (D.C. Minn. 1983); Wipperfurth v. U-Haul Co. of Western
Wisconsin, Inc., 101 Wis. 2d 586, 304 N.W.2d 767 (1981); McDonald's Corp. v.
Markim, Inc., 209 Neb. 49, 306 N.W.2d 158 (1981); Hein-Werner Corp. v. Jackson
Industries, Inc., 364 Mass. 523, 306 N.E.2d 440 (1974); Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello,
63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598, cert denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1973). The Mazda-type analysis has led an increasing number of courts to deny retroactive coverage of
franchise acts. See, e.g., Chico's Pizza Franchises, Inc. v. Sisemore, 544 F. Supp.
248 (E.D. Wash. 1981), aff'd, 685 F.2d 440 (9th Cir. 1982); Ward v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 123 Ariz. 208, 598 P.2d 1027 (1979); United States Brewers Ass'n v.
Nebraska, 192 Neb. 328, 220 N.W.2d 544 (1974); Globe Liquor Co. v. Four Roses
Distillers Co., 281 A.2d 19 (Del. Super.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 873 (1971).
121. Kealey Pharmacy & Home Care Service v. Walgreen Co., 539 F. Supp.
1357, 1363 (W.D. Wis. 1982), aff'd in part & vacated in part, 761 F.2d 345 (7th
Cir. 1985).
122. See Wipperfurth v. U-Haul Co. of Western Wis., 101 Wis. 2d 586, 304
N.W.2d 767 (1981).
123. See Kealey Pharmacy, 539 F. Supp. at 1363.
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ment"124 should be treated as a new contract for the purposes of
the FMFA.
Similarly, a modification to a contract may constitute a new
agreement, depending upon the character of the modification. 2
Evidence of modified sales quotas or pricing policies have been
held substantial enough to constitute a new agreement subject to a
franchise act's coverage. 126 However, a modification such as the relinquishment of part of a franchisor's sales territory has been held
not of sufficient magnitude so as to constitute a "fresh"

agreement. 127
The occurrence of certain events may, by definition, create a
new relationship between franchised parties. For example, the
merger of a franchisor with another manufacturing company was
held to have de facto established new franchise relationships between the merged company and its franchisees.2 2 Thus, even
though the Act may not be retroactive, it applies to continuing
franchise relationships upon renewal, modification, or de facto
renewals.
B.

Good Cause

In a statute purportedly enacted to remedy inequities inherent
in the termination of franchises, it seems ironic that the statute
unequivocally fails to require "good cause" of the franchisor prior
to terminating a franchisee. Initially, it appears that this statute
has ignored a substantive right enjoyed by virtually every other
franchise protected by state or federal franchise regulations." 9
However, it is this departure from the vast majority of franchise
124. See Reinders Bros., Inc. v. Rain Bird Eastern Sales Corp., 627 F.2d 44,
49-50 (7th Cir. 1980).
125. See Kealey Pharmacy, 539 F. Supp. at 1363.
126. See Bitronics Sales Co. v. Microsemiconductor Corp., BUSINESS
FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH)
8101 at 14,142 (D.C. Minn. 1983); Kealey Pharmacy,
539 F. Supp. at 1363.
127. See Rochester v. Royal Appliance Mfr. Co., 569 F. Supp. 736, 739 (W.D.
Wis. 1983); Swan Sales Corp. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., BUSINESS FRANCHISE
GUIDE (CCH)
8440 (Wis. App. 1985).
128. Menominee Rubber Co. v. Gould, Inc., BUSINESS FRANCHISE GUIDE
(CCH) 7702 (7th Cir. 1981).
129. See, e.g., Fern & Klein, Restrictions on Termination and Nonrenewal of
Franchises:A Policy Analysis, 36 Bus. LAW. 1041, 1046-47 (1981) ("In at least two
states ...the relevant statutes set forth no provision requiring 'good cause' prior
to termination or nonrenewal .... It is apparent that the protection afforded

franchisees in these states may be minimal.").
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acts-and indeed, the other North Carolina franchise related
acts'° 0-that places this Act on the leading edge in the rapidly
evolving body of franchise law.
The "good cause" requirement, while intuitively popular for
the appearance of protection that it offers, has become meaningless
as a deterrent to unfair terminations. 131 The repurchase requirement, on the other hand, provides a substantial economic disincentive to arbitrary or capricious terminations. The Act is apparently
premised upon the presumption that the realities of market forces
will appropriately deal with a franchisor who abuses its superior
bargaining position.
Through judicial interpretation and statutory limitations, the
"good cause" genre franchise statute has failed to provide franchisees adequate statutory leverage from which to attack the practices
of franchisors. For example, the numerous judicial rulings surrounding the federal Petroleum Marketing Practices Act' 3-an
early "good cause" statute-have repeatedly demonstrated the
statute's failure to remedy a historically abusive industry. 33 The
PMPA is one of the most comprehensive "good cause" statutes;
Congress provided an intricate and specific listing of events constituting good cause for termination, and an extensive list of events
that did not.134 For the most part, courts have been unreceptive to
130. The North Carolina Wine Distribution Act requires "good cause," which
includes "failure of the wholesaler to comply substantially ...

with any reasona-

ble and material requirement imposed upon him by the winery." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 18B-1204 (1985). The North Carolina Automobile Dealer Franchise Act similarly requires "good cause" and "good faith" in termination of a franchisee. Id at
§ 20-305(6) (1985).
131. A graphic example of the failure of "good cause" statutes may be found
in New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 110 n.14 (1978),
where it was noted that of the forty-two protests under the California Automobile
Dealers' Act, only one had been granted a remedy under the Act. Thus, in only
one of forty-two cases was good cause found. See further, Vintage Imports, Ltd. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Va. 1976); General Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144 F. Supp. 381, 395 (D. Colo. 1956); United States Brewers' Ass'n, Inc. v. Nebraska, 192 Neb. 328, 220 N.W.2d 544 (1974). See generally,
Comment, Adjusting the Equities in Franchising Termination: A Sui Generis
Approach, 30 CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. 523 (1981).
132. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801 et seq. (1982). Cf. supra note 27 and commentary
cited therein.
133. "It is generally conceded that the gasoline station situation is almost
hopeless and offers a prime example of the worst abuses in franchising." Brown,
supra note 9, at 657.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 2802 (1982).
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135
either expansion or contraction of the Act's literal requirements.
Petroleum franchisors have rapidly discovered methods of terminating franchisees under the PMPA good cause requirements,
which, aside from an increased level of covertness, are as arbitrary
and capricious as before the statute. 136 But now, as far as the
courts are concerned, these terminations have the express blessing
37
of Congress.
The FMFA dispenses with the fiction of "good cause" in
franchise terminations. Rather, in a strictly pragmatic fashion, it
requires a franchisor to confront the decision to terminate a
franchise as a pure business decision. Presumably, if a termination
is based upon arbitrary grounds, it will be contrary to the
franchisor's economic interests. On the other hand, if the termination is based upon a rational business purpose such as stagnant
profits or trademark violations by the franchisee, then the
franchisor's legitimate exercise of its right to terminate will be unhampered by the fictional "good cause" requirement.
In any case, the franchisee remains protected by the FMFA.
Although the franchisee is denied a statutory ground for questioning the cause of its termination,' 38 it is guaranteed that it will be

135. Fern & Kline, supra note 129, at 142.
136. See generally, Munno v. Amoco Oil Co., 488 F. Supp. 1114 (D. Conn.
1980)(failure of dealer to agree to franchisor's 200-300% increase in rent constitutes basis for good cause termination by franchisor); Crown Central Petroleum
Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F. Supp. 759 (M.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 634 F.2d 127 (1980)
(failure to remain open 24 hours daily, year round, was good cause to terminate);
Palmieri v. Mobil Oil Corp., 682 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1982)(PMPA "does not require
franchisor to use objectively reasonable and economically realistic criteria in determining amount of rent to be charged for retail franchise"). See further, Finch,
JudicialInterpretationsof the Petroleum Marketing PracticesAct: Strict Construction of Remedial Legislation, 37 Bus. LAW. 141 (1981).
137. In justifying a 200-300% rent increase as good cause for termination, the
court held:
[T]he legislative history suggests that courts have been directed to look
to the franchisor's intent rather than to the effect of its actions. If it is
only using proposed changes to the lease to disguise an illegal attempt to
discriminate against the franchisee and thereby drive him from business,
the court is empowered to interfere. If, on the other hand, a good faith
application of a rental formula operates unreasonably in a particular
case, the dictates of the marketplace alone will govern the transaction.
This interpretation is completely in accord with the perceived abuse
which Congress sought to rectify.
Munno, 488 F. Supp. at 1119.
138. Of course, the franchisee is not precluded from pursuing remedies
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss2/5
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financially returned to a position near status quo ante. The Act
creates a mandatory market for a substantial portion of the franchisee's tangible assets. 3 '
V.

CONCLUSION

In enacting the FMFA, the North Carolina General Assembly
sought to provide a deterrent to the abuse that is prevalent in the
termination of agricultural implement franchises. The FMFA provides a number of specific remedies and procedures that must be
followed by the parties to a franchise agreement and requires the
supplier to repurchase inventory of the dealer upon termination.
The Act builds upon the experience of the past several decades of
franchise legislation-the heretofore popular "good cause" requirement for termination is replaced by a more pragmatic inventory
repurchase requirement. In this regard, the Act is on the forefront
of current franchise law. In this period of a rapidly declining farm
economy, it is predictable that the practical aspects of the Act will
soon be implemented, and the theoretical bases upon which it is
founded will be put to test.
Paul C. Ridgeway

outside of the FMFA including actions under the North Carolina Unfair Trade
Practices Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1 et seq. (1985), federal antitrust laws, contract actions and common law actions.
139. A number of commentators have suggested that a terminated franchisee
be compensated for its goodwill value as well as its tangible assets. Such a remedy
would draw the franchisee nearer to status quo ante. See Brown, supra note 9, at
655; Comment, Adjusting the Equities in Franchising Termination: A Sui
Generis Approach, 30 CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. 523, 567-68 (1981). The FMFA
makes no such allowance.
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